Arms
Sales to Dictators: The Strategic Glue of U.S. Domination
New
York Times story touches parts of the Trump elephant, but misses the empire in the
room
Do you recall the parable from India of the six blind
men and the elephant? Each man touched a different part of an elephant, and so each
concluded something different about its nature (it’s a wall, a snake, a rope, a
spear...). The lesson is that one has to put together all the parts before
knowing the whole.
The New York Times
recently published a wonderful “touching the elephant” news
story on arms sales to the formerly colonized countries
under presidents Obama and Trump. The article gives us a rare glimpse into the “how”
of this multi-billion dollar business, but this focus on the commercial side of
things ignores the all-important “why.” Using another elephant metaphor, you
might say the Times, like most mainstream commentators on U.S. foreign policy,
misses the empire in the room.
Explaining arms sales
without an understanding of the imperial necessity that drives them calls to
mind a dismissive reaction in 1961 by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. He’d
been asked about U.S. policy in South Viet Nam, which was then just another
post-colonial country in our global network of friendly regimes propped up with
arms, cash, “military advisers,” and spies. RFK replied: “We’ve got 20 Viet
Nams a day to handle!” He could never have guessed that we would shortly kill
two million people to preserve what the Pentagon Papers called the “credibility”
of our implied threat to “handle” the rest of them the same way if need be.
So, the Times has
published a fascinating article, but one that places undue emphasis on
distinctions that are fundamentally without a difference in the context of the
U.S. strategy of domination of the global battle space through alliances with
cooperative regimes. These distinctions include civilian versus military
casualties, offensive versus defensive weapons, Trump versus Obama, and the
State Department’s interests versus those of the rest of the national security
bureaucracy.
Titled Why Bombs Made
in America Have Been Killing Civilians in Yemen, the Times story shows us, from
the perspectives of a few of the corporate and government players, the ins and
outs of the approval of sales of bombs to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen’s civil
war. It reads like a true-life version of a novel
I recently published, Arms Deals: A Mar’Shae McGurk Thriller
about “Shopping to Get Yours.”
Here's the timeline:
· Despite
Saudi Arabia invading Yemen in March 2015 and causing substantial civilian
casualties with air attacks from the very first day, the Obama administration,
under a policy of “defensive” support for Saudi Arabia, approved a Raytheon sale
to the Kingdom of 120,000 bombs for $3 billion. Deliveries of the bombs
continued for a year and a half until Obama suspended them in December 2016,
his last month in office, in response to a particularly deadly and
well-reported attack on civilians in the capital city of Sana’a in October.
· Soon
after his inauguration in January 2017, Trump lifted the suspension of bomb deliveries.
However, in June 2017, Republican Senator Bob Corker, the chair of the Foreign
Relations committee, put a “hold” on future ‘pre-notifications” of proposed
sales of “lethal military equipment” to Saudi Arabia and a number of other Gulf
countries. The hold included a $2 billion contract for more Raytheon bombs, but
it was not related to the war in Yemen. It was intended to end the Gulf states’
pressure campaign against Qatar because of stories published by Qatari-based al-Jazeera
and alleged Qatari support for terrorism. While the campaign against Qatar continues
today, that hold was lifted in February 2018.
· However,
Corker’s top Democratic counterpart on the Foreign Relations committee, Senator
Bob Menendez, quickly placed a new hold on future sales of bombs to Saudi
Arabia because of civilian casualties in Yemen. These sales also included the
$2 billion Raytheon follow-on contract. Menendez’s hold was strengthened by congressional
reaction to the Saudi government’s murder of journalist and regime critic Jamal
Khashoggi in October 2018.
· Menendez’s
hold was finally overturned by the rare decision in May 2019 by Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo to approve the Saudi sale and other delayed Gulf sales under
an emergency provision of the arms export act. This provision gives Congress 30
days to enact a law blocking the sale, and Congress did pass such a law.
However, the Senate failed to overturn President Trump’s veto. Neither chamber addressed
the issue in a must-have appropriation bill to set up a more credible confrontation
with the president, so the arms continued to flow.
Of course, this being the
Times, much of its story is opinion masquerading as news. In “these troubled
times,” which apparently started November 9, 2016, the left-leaning traditional
and social media are part of “the resistance” to President Trump and his
policies. Their news stories present harsh opinions on Trump’s escapades as
fact and “fact-checking.”
Opinion as news at the
Times goes back at least as far as the 2002 buildup to the invasion of Iraq, with
reporter Judith Miller’s phony case for “weapons of mass destruction” being just
the tip
of the iceberg that killed hundreds of times more people
than were lost on the Titanic. And it’s long been egregious in the Times’ elimination
of critiques in its flood of articles supporting the speculative narrative of
dangerous, human-caused “climate change.”
But lately the Times has
gone way off the rails to promote all manner of politically-correct narratives
as fact. The enforced closing of the climate change debate -- first on campuses
dominated by activist professors who were, as Joseph Ellis argues, “not merely unscholarly,
but anti-scholarly,” and then in the Times and other left-leaning media -- was in
many ways the dry run for today’s pervasive “cancel culture.”
Consider the Times’ tendentious,
race-focused 1619 Project, which started
with a novel, false, and actually really loopy claim, given the well-documented
political thought of the American Revolution, that “one
of the primary reasons the colonists decided to declare their independence from
Britain was because they wanted to protect the institution of slavery.” Slavery
was indeed the price of union, in 1776, 1787, and even 1860, in Abraham
Lincoln’s campaign platform. However, there was no threat to American slavery
from Britain until well after the Revolutionary consensus had been adopted and
open combat had begun.
So, it’s not unexpected that
the Times would create a narrative about Saudi sales to please its rebellious
staff and regular readers, which is that Trump pushes arms sales for their
economic benefits “with little regard for how the weapons are used,” and not
for reasons of “diplomacy” and with concern for human rights, as President Obama
did. But that narrative is deeply misleading.
Starting with the demise
of President Carter’s policies of reducing sales to human right abusers and telling
State Department officials in a “leprosy” memo not to assist or even interact
with American companies trying to sell weapons, all presidents have pushed arms
sales for the jobs and profits they deliver to military contractors -- and hence
the votes they deliver to both parties. It’s telling that the demise actually
occurred during Carter’s presidency, well before President
Reagan’s Secretary of State Alexander Haig formally revoked the policies.
I know this all too well
from my 20 years of trying and failing, in Congress as a staffer and around
Congress as a lobbyist, to ban arms transfers to dictators. In 1992, for
example, candidate Bill Clinton and President Bush competed to be the first to
override the opposition of both the State and Defense Departments and sell
advanced fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Since then, every president has
talked about limiting the economic waste, human rights abuses, and regional
tensions that come with arms sales to repressive regimes in the Middle East,
but then has gone ahead and set records in real dollar terms for arms sales
there, and globally.
President Obama made a
visit to Saudi Arabia early in his presidency, just like Trump, and made the
same hard push for the Saudis to waste their money on American weapons, not
Britain’s or Russia’s. All that’s really different about Trump on arms sales is
that he dispenses with the sweet talk.
It’s important to note
that arms sales actually add little to overall American employment and profit, but
add a lot to the particular jobs and profits of the union and the owners at the
particular exporting corporation. How can that be? Why wouldn’t an arms sale
help the American economy as a whole?
First, the sales are
effectively subsidized by the taxpayer, who could have spent the subsidy elsewhere
or just let it hum through the domestic economy. This is true even when the
sale is not funded by U.S. foreign aid, because the Pentagon paid to create the
arms-makers’ production lines for its own purchases, so it is solely the
companies who profit from the additional foreign sales. In addition, the sales
stimulate demand by regional competitors who use U.S. foreign aid to try to
keep up. For example, Israel’s aid-funded purchases counter the military
challenges from Saudi and Emirati cash sales. Even the Pentagon gets in on this
scam, asking for a next generation of weapons to be able to defeat those we
just exported.
Arms sales also provide a
rationale for more U.S. military deployments in a region, because the threat
level and instability have increased. By aiding dictators, the sales often lead
to civil war and economic disaster, reducing American export opportunities. Finally,
and most fundamentally, by the reality of “additionality,” our economy would
have received export demand as an indirect result of any purchase by the country
that instead bought our weapons.
As economist Bill Hartung
explained in a
letter to the Times about its article and Trump’s 25-times exaggerated
claim of half a million jobs from Saudi sales, the arms jobs from a sale simply
displace other jobs in other categories of our economy in which the Saudis
would have spent their money. And even if the Saudis had spent the money on
arms from France, water treatment plants from Australia, or movies from Bollywood,
a good share of the increased purchasing power in the global economy would have
led to follow-on purchases in the world’s biggest economy – ours.
That’s the beauty of
additionality when your economy is central to the world economy, and your
currency is held as a reserve and used as an instrument throughout the world!
You don’t have to worry about particular sales – unless you have something else
on your mind than overall employment and profit. And U.S. policy does have
something else on its mind: holding together the empire.
Arms sales are the glue
for our system of domination of the former colonial countries. These countries had
hoped they were done with foreign control after their independence movements
succeeded in the decades after World War II. Looking at the map of U.S. military
deployments today, you can tell that their hopes were dashed. We are the new
empire, and we use arms sales to bind our friendly dictators to it.
*
* *
Perhaps it’s not really
the Times’ fault that the article misses the elephant in the room here, our empire.
By telling an inside story, and telling it well, the Times pretty much has to
stick to the issues that the insiders tackle. Still, it would have been nice if
there had been an attempt to get commentary from analysts who could place the
tale in the context of our foreign policy.
Of course, that sounds
like I wish the Times had called me to comment on behalf of my anti-imperial
American Exceptionalism Media Project, which of course I would have loved. But
there are any number of thinkers and think-tanks out there who could have done
the job. There’s Ted Galen Carpenter at the libertarian, anti-interventionist
Cato Institute, John Feffer and Phyllis Bennis at the left-leaning,
anti-interventionist Institute for Policy Studies, and Andrew Bacevich and
Steven Wertheim at the Soros-Koch funded anti-imperial Quincy Institute for
Responsible Statecraft. And academia is surprisingly replete with scholars
whose anti-imperial analysis is a historical conclusion, rather than an advocacy
of change. Any of them could have helped the Times see that the primary reason for
U.S. arms sales differs from the largely commercial reasons of our badly
outdistanced competitors, Russia, France, China, and Britain.
That reason is empire,
for which perhaps the Times intended “diplomacy” to be polite shorthand. Only
France, and only in its formerly formal but still effective West African colonial
empire, acts like us in this regard.
When a country uses U.S.
arms it is bound logistically to our network of air, land, sea, space, and
covert forces, and to our intelligence and communications agencies. U.S. military
strategy has achieved domination in all battle spaces, in all corners of the
world. For that, it needs forward basing, logistical and intelligence support,
and cooperation that is both rapid and sustained. It takes a village of allies
to allow us to bestride the globe in our “fly every day, fight by tonight”
state of readiness.
Intelligence pours in and
individual relationships are cemented as our forces and agents interact
constantly with other countries’ personnel on training, equipping, spying, and
joint exercises. Purchasers come to be regarded, and regard themselves, as our
allies, despite the lack of treaties approved by the Senate or formal Status of
Forces agreements reported to Congress.
By missing the context of
empire, the Times goes down four blind alleys. First, it cites many officials
bemoaning civilian casualties from Saudi air raids. Second, it makes
distinctions between types of weapons. Third, it focuses on differences between
the Obama and Trump administrations in motivation and in operation. Fourth, it
complains that the State Department and its human rights concerns have been
marginalized under Trump. Let’s take these in order.
Civilian casualties:
The bombing of civilians in Yemen, whether caused by insouciance, purpose, or
collateral reality, is not at the core of the humanitarian crisis there. The war
itself is the crisis. Attacks by air and ground forces always extract a direct
cost in lives and property. However, it is the indirect impact of war on the
economy and hence family income and public infrastructure that is the real
killer. Especially in developing countries where services and survival are already
close to the edge, lives are lost in the millions every decade to war’s
inevitable disease, malnutrition, and medical meltdown.
Senator Menendez’s 2018
“hold” on Saudi sales wasn’t, as the Times claims, an “attempt to stop the arms
feeding the Yemen war.” It was only a reaction to bad targeting: “I don’t have
an ideological problem” with arms sales to Saudi, he says in the article, but
only with uses that “violate international norms” and hit civilians.
Differentiating between types
of weapons: The Saudis asked President Obama to approve the
invasion of Yemen a few hours before it began in March 2015. He did, but the
Times reports that he decided to offer “primarily defensive support,” based on
the need to help Saudi fend
off
missile attacks from Yemen. Of course, in war such an offensive-defensive
distinction is impossible. Sales of U.S. arms and training and even bomb sales
continued until civilian casualties in Sana’a in October led to the December
2016 suspension of bomb deliveries. U.S. military and intelligence cooperation
in targeting, battlefield information, and aerial refueling continued
throughout Obama’s term.
Considering some weapons
as “offensive” as opposed to “defensive” is reminiscent of the Reagan
administration’s efforts, often successful, to encourage war-weary Members of
Congress to provide the Nicaraguan contras “humanitarian” aid like food
and uniforms and “non-lethal” aid like medical supplies and communications
gear. There is no such thing as humanitarian and non-lethal aid to a killing
machine. An army fights on its stomach and sends in attack orders on field
telephones.
Non-governmental backers of
the UN Arms Trade Treaty, which came into force in 2014, made the same sort of mistake
by agreeing to limit it to blocking only particular weapons that had been
misused. The proposed Nobel Peace Laureates Arms Trade Code of Conduct from the
1990’s had the right idea: to support democracy and stop human rights abuses
you need to cut off ALL weapons and military support to dictators and
repressive regimes, not just the bombs they drop or the bullets they fire. They
can get those anywhere if you’ve already sold them the infrastructure to use
it.
If the civilian toll in
Sana’a was so horrific, why did Obama feel the need to maintain overall aid and
support for Saudi Arabia’s military forces? Because the United States and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have had an alliance since 1945, when it was cemented
with a DC-3 aircraft given to founding King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, complete with
pilots and crew, and a flock
of sheep given to President Roosevelt. They give us and the
West access to oil and provide military, diplomatic, and intelligence
cooperation. We provide their military infrastructure and sustain their continued
rule.
Delaying deliveries of a
few new bombs was a symbolic rather than concrete effort to reduce the civilian
toll. It was not even a policy decision to push for an end to the war itself,
let alone a threat to undo the underlying imperial bargain. The continuation of
the U.S.-Saudi bargain, repeated daily in the scores of developing countries
that make up our imperial support system, was a given.
Obama vs. Trump:
The Times ardently looks for differences between the Obama and Trump administrations,
particularly in their working relations with arms exporters. It should have
looked for similarities instead, particularly the similar imperative they
inherited to preserve the empire. Obama
backed the war to maintain our strategic relationship
with the Saudi monarchy and to keep it actively supporting negotiations for the
Iran nuclear deal. Trump kept on backing Saudi Arabia for the first reason alone.
The Times argues, without
evidence, that Trump’s reversal of Obama’s suspension of bomb deliveries and
support for more sales helped “prolong” the war. But the Obama suspension was
not even intended to end the war, but rather to make sure it was conducted properly,
against military targets.
Then the Times makes much
of what it calls a “statement of regret” by 30 former Obama officials,
including UN ambassador Samantha Power and National Security Advisor Susan
Rice, who now call for a suspension of U.S. support for the war. Note that this
is not the same as what would really be required to move Saudi Arabia to
settlement, a threat to end U.S. military relations.
First of all, there is not
one word of regret in the
statement. Instead, it is a flat-out justification for the
Obama decision, which it calls a policy of “conditional support” designed to
“gain leverage” with the Saudis to reduce civilian casualties and spur a
diplomatic settlement. The statement contrasts this noble policy – which is nonsensical
to its core – with a “blank check” Trump policy of “unconditional support” for
a Saudi victory.
One of the signers, NSC
staffer Andrew Miller, told the Times that “the war had gone in a direction we
had not anticipated.” Oh, really? Like in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and
Syria, all of which Obama once bombed or drone-attacked, along with Yemen, in a
single day? What direction should you expect when you back a party to a civil
war? After a career at the State Department sending weapons to Middle East
dictators, Miller now “promotes Middle East democracy” at the Carnegie
Institute.
Another signer is Steve
Pomper, who wants us to know that he and his fellow NSC staffers were “serious,
humane people.” He told the Times that: “People make miscalculations all the
time. But it was striking to me as
I reflected on my time in the Obama administration that it wasn’t just that we
embarked on this escapade -- it’s that we didn’t pull ourselves out of it.”
This notion that helping an ally when it goes to war is a
“miscalculation” recalls the claim by many officials that the Viet Nam war was
a “mistake.” But Obama backing and then continuing to back our ally Saudi Arabia
at war, like President Johnson backing and continuing to back our ally South
Viet Nam, was no miscalculation or mistake – it was an inevitable result of the
network of imperial bargains that constitute our foreign policy in developing
countries.
Pomper now writes about Obama’s “atrocity prevention” program at the
Holocuast Museum and chairs the International Crisis Group. He made a few other
telling comments to the Times. The Saudi arms sales, he says, were “like
flypaper in trapping the U.S. in Yemen.” But flypaper glues both ways. Arms sales
also glue our allies to our empire’s need for bases and support.
At the NSC Pomper worked
on what appear to be unsuccessful attempts to train Saudi pilots into not
hitting civilians, but he admits that there was a larger issue at play here: “We
were in Yemen. We shouldn’t have been there.” Really? Having an empire means
you have to back your imperial allies. To paraphrase Bobby Kennedy, we’ve got
20 Yemens a day to handle. They come with the territory for an empire.
Pomper’s work on training
is part of a decades-old imperial sleight of hand, under all administrations, in
which bureaucrats try to convince human rights activists, despite massacre
after massacre and coup after coup, that U.S. military training improves not just
military performance but attitudes and behaviors about human rights and
democracy. But this entire debate is a dodge.
The strategic purpose of
the program is not found in performance or behavior, but in the creation of a
network to gather intelligence and increase cooperation in future crises. The Pentagon’s
Defense Intelligence Agency keeps careful track of where the trainees and their
U.S. military contacts and their postings, so that they can connect with each
other quickly when U.S. forces need inside information, access to intelligence,
and help with operations.
Another signer was Susan
Rice’s top deputy at the NSC. Ben Rhodes told the Times that the Saudi invasion
“happened so quickly” with no time for Obama’s usual “very rigorous process.” But
the decision to back Saudi Arabia could have been changed any time during the year
and a half between the invasion and the suspension of a tiny component of
assistance.
Rhodes said that backing
the Saudi invasion was like “getting in a car with a drunk driver.” Solipsistically,
Rhodes seems not to have considered that perhaps the entire framework of our
arms sales to developing countries makes us, and not the recipients, the drunk
driver, unable to stop doing what she knows is dangerous to human health and
well-being.
Rhodes is an English major who became a speechwriter,
first for the 9/11 commission and later for candidate Obama. Incredibly he rose
to became the number two White House official for national security and be named
by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the top 100 global thinkers. Only in America,
land of opportunity. Among Rhodes’ finest global thoughts is surely this mystifying
one in the Times, about policy in Yemen: “Looking back, I wonder what we might have done differently,
particularly if we’d somehow known that Obama was going to be succeeded by a
President Trump.”
On the commercial side, the
Times is particularly shocked, shocked that Raytheon has great access to
executive branch officials under Trump. But like all of us on all sides of
policy, Raytheon should be able to exercise its First Amendment right to
“petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Access doesn’t guarantee
anything more than a hearing, and government officials benefit from hearing divergent,
even admittedly self-interested views.
And officials do hear
such views, all the time, not just from lobbyists, the media, and angry
citizens, but from their allies in Congress. And not just on every sale with
local jobs at stake but on every issue in every permutation under the sun. I’ve
met with staff at State, Defense, Treasury, AID, the NSC, and the White House
under many administrations to advocate such things as a ban on arms to
dictators, an end to U.S. support for military forces and wars from Central America
to Africa and the Middle East, a ban on anti-personnel landmines, a requirement
for self-destructing fuses on cluster bombs, an end to World Bank loans to
governments whose armies won’t let civilian authorities audit their budgets,
and more recently, some sanity on blocking electricity projects in Africa over an
always projected but never occurring climate crisis. Sometimes it made no
immediate difference, sometimes it did, but it’s how DC works.
The Times acknowledges
that Raytheon’s CEO was able to have a conversation with Susan Rice to ask her
to reverse the suspension of bomb deliveries. She just said no – although that
was easy, since the decision was only Obama’s for a month. Trump just said yes,
as would eventually have happened with any president when an American company
has produced an item, on promise of payment, with the approval of the U.S.
government, and now can’t get paid.
The Times reveals that Raytheon
hired former State Department officials as lobbyists, which the Project on Government
Oversight told the Times is “legalized corruption” because the lobbyists are “being
hired for who they know.” But why is hiring experts with the ability to talk knowledgeably
and credibly to staff and Members of Congress corrupt? We all, human rights
groups and arms sellers, hire people with connections to push our proposals.
Who got corrupted? As I show in my arms novel, corruption occurs when lobbyists
arrange contingent donations, and there is no evidence of that in the Times
story.
Trump approved a new arms
sales policy guidance that has the purpose of “economic security” in it, which
the Times says is a first. It may be a first in print, but it certainly is not
the first time that administrations considered economics as part of arms sales decisions.
Raytheon merged with United Technologies. These are huge corporations surviving
on Pentagon spending. Congress and the administration have tremendous political
and economic incentives to keep them bustling. Arms sales have long helped bring
unit prices down for the Pentagon, and let the Pentagon off the hook to keep
the production lines open itself when its own buy slows or ends.
Trump trade adviser Peter
Navarro, the bȇte noire of the story for his work “to bring to heel a
bunch of career bureaucrats” who were slow-walking sales that the president had
approved, told the Times: “I don’t advocate for companies. I advocate for the
president and workers and for our men and women in uniform.” That is all well
and good, but he, like all the Obama staff, are also advocating for the
imperial network that supports our men and women in uniform as they implement our
strategy of dominating the global battle space.
Of course, the Times
story delightfully proves that arms corporations like Raytheon strain credulity
when they say they don’t try to make policy, but only follow it. I haven’t
heard that one since a memorial policy event in 2006 for Cornell professor Arch
Dotson, from one his arms-dealing former students. I reminded him that Bruce
Jackson, the vice president of Lockheed-Martin, which wanted to and did then
sell fighter planes to Poland, served as the co-chair of the Committee to
Expand NATO in the 1990s, alongside Democratic power lawyer Greg Craig.
Weakening the State
Department: Finally, the Times presents aggrieved officials arguing
that both the State Department as a whole and its bureau that monitors countries’
records on democracy and human rights were not as closely consulted on arms
sales as in previous administrations. This is a strange complaint, coming from the
cabinet department that must rule on all arms sales.
In this case, Secretary Rex
Tillerson worked with Senator Corker to hold up new Saudi sales for seven months
in
an attempt to force the Kingdom to end its pressure on Qatar. Trump
backed Saudi Arabia in the dispute, and Tillerson finally accepted the president’s
repeated, explicit order to move on. Only then did he meet with Corker to ask
him to lift
the hold. The Times reports that Raytheon devoted itself to overturning the
hold, but it sure took a long time against the powerful State Department bureaucracy.
State Department officials
“worried that a White House trade advisor with no foreign policy role was expediting
arms sales with profound diplomatic consequences.” Navarro’s response was that
he just “accelerated” the pace of approval. The Times said that this prodding “diminished”
the stature of the State Department, as did White House son-in-law Jared Kushner’s
failure to invite a State Department official to a planning session on potential
sales to discuss during Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia. But in every administration,
every arms deal has multiple players with differing agendas. Companies don’t just
sit back and hope for the best when a billion-dollar deal enters the approval
pipeline. They look for staff in various departments and agencies who agree
with sales, and then ask them to check in to see what is taking so long at the
State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.
Some in the State
Department’s monitoring bureau for human rights felt that “the administration
did not seem concerned about human rights issues.” But what is the “concern”
that was demonstrated in previous administrations? As I learned in 1983 when
writing Human Rights: The Carter Record, the Reagan Reaction with Anne-Marie
Smith for the Center for International Policy, at the end of the day of internal
debate and public posturing, arms sales are almost always approved.
The monitoring bureau was
called Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs when it was founded because of post-Watergate
concerns about our links to despots and because of a reform law that barred arming
human rights abusers…except when it didn’t. Despite being led by stellar human
rights advocates, the bureau has never, under either Democratic or Republican
administrations, been a player when it comes to arms and training for big
buyers. From the start, everybody understood the bromide that “human rights is
for little countries that don’t matter, not big countries that do.”
President Carter’s
appointee, civil rights icon Patt Derian, was marginalized along with Roberta
Cohen and her other deputies by imperial hawks like Richard Holbrooke at State’s
East Asia bureau and Zbigniew Brzezinski at the National Security Council. Under
President Clinton the bureau was renamed Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and
was led by international human rights experts John Shattuck and then Harold Koh.
They and NSC democracy czar Mort Halperin made powerful arguments that were brushed
aside every crunch-time.
President Obama went a
step further, and actually appointed two leaders of human rights groups, Michael
Posner of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Tom Malinowski of Human Rights
Watch. They played what long-time human rights activist Holly Burkhalter calls “the
common scold” as well as any of their predecessors, but to no avail. Despite their
lovely speeches, Obama, like all previous administrations, set records for arms
sales to dictators.
Malinowski, now in the
House, criticized Trump’s arms sales in the Times story, saying that “people
look to us” to stand for more than “our naked self-interest.” He is clearly not
listening to the people I know in the developing world, who tend to see us an
obvious empire pursuing our obvious military self-interests as we, for example,
kept arming and training the Bahraini police after they shot down pro-democracy
demonstrators in 2011. We read that Trump’s policies were “met with alarm” in
the bureau, but I hope that such policies of previous presidents were as well.
The imperial bargain requires arms sales, and there is almost always a military
necessity, a will that finds a way to frustrate the promotion of democracy and
human rights.
As an example of reduced
concern for human rights, the Times reported that the bureau was not in on Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo’s emergency decision to provide arms to Saudi Arabia. This
makes sense, though. The U.S. government has had 45 years to bar sales to Saudi
Arabia on human rights grounds, and has always chosen not to. What role would
the bureau play in the decision? There is no longer a Christopher committee,
which deputy secretary Warren Christopher used under Carter to force the various
national security bureaucracies to at least listen to the case for human rights
conditionality.
In addition, it is hard
to compare the bureau’s exclusion to what previous administrations did, since those
emergency authorities had only been used three
times before. Assuming that Pompeo kept his circle small because he wanted
to control leaks that could have derailed the decision as it was being planned,
this Times story full of unnamed bureau sources shows he made the right call.
A pairing of incidents
during Steven Pomper’s tenure at the NSC reveals the necessary contradictions
of prompting human rights under an empire. To defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army,
liberal Democrats in Congress in 2010 pushed for aid to train and equip the Ugandan
Army that maintains the corrupt and repressive Museveni regime. In 2014 Pomper approved
helicopter lift for the Ugandan troops, but at the same time also moved
a Pentagon regional Air Chiefs meeting out of Uganda because of the passage of an
anti-gay criminal code. This mixed message was received as, well, mixed up: six
years later in Uganda Museveni still rules as a dictator backed by his Army, the
LRA is still abducting children, and it’s still a life sentence for “serial”
gayness.
While presenting Trump as
egregious in his commercial focus, the Times allows that human rights were also
trumped because other presidents “sometimes show a willingness to achieve
narrow goals by arming rough regimes.” Please! There is nothing narrow about
empire. It's as big as the globe, and it dominates, indeed guarantees, all the
inevitably positive decisions about arms sales to dictators. By missing the
reality of our empire, the Times of necessity misses the core reason for the
Saudi arms sales.
In this the Times is like
the protesters who today are pressing elected governments to take down historical
statues – and the vandals trying just to do it undemocratically. They think of
evil systems as occurring in the mists of time, but we’ve got one going on right
here, right now. I’d rather we were tearing down not statues of the past, but statutes
of the present that permit arms sales to dictators.
Empires always portray
themselves as humanitarian, and they easily find court historians who agree.
John Bolton’s new book about the Trump White House reveals more about his myopia
than about Trump’s. Bolton explaining how the world benefits from America’s global
military dominance sounds just like a British minister in 1890 (and historian
Niall Ferguson in 2002) explaining why British rule in Africa and India was not
a brutal grab of resources, but rather a mutually beneficial mission of Livingstone’s
three C’s -- commerce, Christianity, and civilization. Empire is evil, make no
mistake. Just ask those who live under it, and under Trump, like under Obama,
like under any president back to FDR, face a U.S.-armed and trained military
force when they push for democracy and human rights.
*
* *
No comments:
Post a Comment